"By accepting two dubious scarcity forecasts, i.e. global peak oil and impending Soviet production collapse, NSC thinking migrated naturally to belief that the Soviets had no choice but to seize Iranian oil supply. To protect this supply from the oncoming Red Army, NSC officials urged a concurrent US invasion of Iran ... Fortunately, the Soviets were not playing the invader’s part assigned to them so the Battle of the Last Barrel was never fought ... Policymakers were not wrong to concern themselves with oil supply. Lessons drawn from 20th century world wars were obviously true; oil wins wars ... The policies adopted as a result were highly provocative to ME inhabitants, whose region became a sort of backdrop for America’s quests to save itself from the imagined calamity of peak oil."
Zum Working Paper von Prof. Roger Stein, erschienen beim Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University (8. Februar 2013) »
Anmerkung: Ungeachtet der merkwürdigen Argumente des Autors gegen Peak Oil, stellt jene Publikation dennoch einen entscheidenden Beleg dafür dar, wie sehr die militärische Kontrolle um Ölreserven, Pipelinetrassen und Seewege die US-Aussenpolitik des 20. Jahrhunderts geprägt hat. Dies ist heute umso mehr der Fall, wie seit den Ereignissen vom 11. September 2001 die Deep Politics des "Global War on Terror", "humanitärer Interventionen", "Responsability-to-Protect" und verdeckter Angriffskriege der NATO gegen Länder wie Afghanistan, Irak, Pakistan, Libyen, Yemen, Mali, Syrien und Iran es dem aufmerksamen Beobachter demonstrieren.
