"The cheap price bubble [in the US] will burst within two-to-four
years. At a high enough price, the supply bubble will
burst perhaps 10-to-15 years later, when drilling locations become
sparse ... Supply can be maintained for many years, but only at
much higher prices with ever-escalating environmental impacts due to the
accelerating number of wells that must be drilled ... The bubble is a result of sweet spots running out of drilling locations
at which time drilling must move to progressively lower quality portions
of the ‘play’, requiring ever more wells and ever higher prices to
justify them. With the exception of the very best sweet spots, shale [is] not very profitable ... Large returns in the
industry [come] from selling assets acquired at low prices early in the
boom, and through joint ventures, and mergers and acquisitions ... Drill or you lose your investment ... After wells are drilled they are put on production to generate cash
flow and maintain stock prices, even though they are unlikely to turn a
profit."
Zum Artikel mit Aussagen von David Hughes, erschienen auf EurActiv (23. Mai 2013) »
Zum Artikel von Geert De Cock "Wishful thinking: Debunking the Myths of the Shale Gas Boom" samt Präsentationen von David Hughes und Dr. Werner Zittel, erschienen auf Food & Water Watch (14. Mai 2013) »
Zur Studie von David Hughes "Drill Baby Drill", erschienen beim Post Carbon Institute (Februar 2013) »
Zum Artikel mit Aussagen von David Hughes, erschienen auf EurActiv (23. Mai 2013) »
Zum Artikel von Geert De Cock "Wishful thinking: Debunking the Myths of the Shale Gas Boom" samt Präsentationen von David Hughes und Dr. Werner Zittel, erschienen auf Food & Water Watch (14. Mai 2013) »
Zur Studie von David Hughes "Drill Baby Drill", erschienen beim Post Carbon Institute (Februar 2013) »
